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COMMENTS
TORTS-SALES-LABILITY OF REMOTE CASUAL SELLER
Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465,
110 N.E. 2d 419 (1953).
A truck rental agency replaced a standard tire rim on one of
its trucks with a misfit. The agency sold the truck to a used car
dealer who resold it, without inspection, to the plaintiff's father.
Plaintiff was thereafter injured as a direct result of the defect,
and brought suit against the original owner and the used car
dealer. The trial court entered judgment for both defendants. The
intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of
the original seller, but reversed the judgment for the used car
dealer. The Supreme Court of Ohio, affirming the intermediate
court's decision, held that the seller of a used car to a dealer is
not liable for damage caused by a defect, if the car was resold
by the dealer prior to the damage, because the intervening
agency of the dealer breaks the "chain of causation."',
There has been a marked trend in the law to extend the
liability of a seller of defective chattels to persons other than
his immediate purchaser who are damaged by the defect. Before
this development began, a seller of defective chattels was liable
only to parties in privity of contract with him. 2 The trend started
by holding a seller liable to remote buyers if the chattel was
"inherently dangerous.' 3 Then in the famous case of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co.,4 a manufacturer was held liable
1. Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 471, 110 N.E.2d 419, 422
(1953). This comment deals only with the liability of the original seller, and
not with the liability of the used car dealer.
The liability of the used car dealer is comparatively well settled by recent
cases. Though the automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality per se it
is imminently dangerous when defective and the majority of cases hold the
used car dealer under a duty to exercise reasonable care in examining the
vehicle before sale. He is then under the duty either to correct the defect
or warn the purchaser of its existence. This is especially true where the sale
is made accompanied by a representation that the chattel is fit for its in-
tended use.
Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1939); Flies v. Fox
Brothers Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928). Also see RESTATS-
MENT, TORTS § 388 (1934).
2. The leading case on this point is Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W.
109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). American cases following this theory are:
Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N.E. 482 (1907);
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009
(1915) ; Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150r S.W. 421
(1912).
3. Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (1837); Dixon
v. Bell, 5 M. & S. 198 (1816).
4. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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to an ultimate buyer on the ground that the chattel was dan-
gerous because defectively made. Since that case manufacturers
of chattles which would be dangerous if defective have been held
liable to anyone who could reasonably be expected to be in the
vicinity of the chattel's probable use.5 The effect of this develop-
ment has been an emphasis on increased protection of the public
and a de-emphasis of possible hardship to particular sellers.,
The gradual abandonment of the privity of contract prere-
quisite to liability has had a marked effect on the liability of
different types of sellers. The liability for negligence of manu-
facturers of chattels which would be dangerous if defective has
been outlined above. Packagers of food products have been held
liable to remote consumers on the same grounds as manufactur-
ers of defective chattels.7 Food packagers also may be liable to
remote consumers because of implied warranties.8 A building
contractor, however, is not liable to third persons who are
injured by his defective construction if that construction was
accepted by the owner of the building; he is liable prior to
acceptance, or if he is guilty of wilful negligence.0 The non-
5. Bird v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y. 1936) (passenger
in automobile); Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E.2d
415 (1936) (user of chattel) ; Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y.
227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923) (purchaser's employees); White Sewing Machine
Co. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927) (member of purchaser's
family. See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 395 (1934).
6. In abandoning the privity of contract theory, Lummus, J., in the case
of Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946), stated the
purpose as follows:
In principle, a manufacturer or other person owning or controlling
a thing that is dangerous in its nature or is in a dangerous condition,
either to his knowledge or as a result of his want of reasonable care
in manufacture or inspection, who deals with or disposes of that thing
in a way that he foresees or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to
foresee will probably carry that thing into contact with some person,
known or unknown, who will probably be ignorant of the danger, owes
a legal duty to every such person to use reasonable care to prevent in-jury to him. [Italics added.]
Id. at 96, 64 N.E.2d at 696. In the beginning of the development of increased
liability there was no distinction made between manufacturers and sellers.
Torgesen v. Schulz, 192 N.Y. 156, 84 N.E. 956 (1908) (defendant was vendor
of siphon bottles); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (defendant
was druggist); Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (defendant was
dock owner supplying staging for ship repairs); George v. Skivington, L.R.
5 Ex. 1 (1869) (defendant was chemist). Cf. Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co. 195
N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909) (defendant was manufacturer).
7. PRossER, TORTS 684, 685 (1941).
8. PRossER, TORTS 688 (1941). Recent cases allowing the retailer to
bring the wholesaler into the action are: Occhipinti v. Buscemi, 71 N.Y.S.2d
766 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951);
Comment, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 327 (1953).
9. Howard v. Reinhart and Donovan Co., 196 Okla. 506, 166 P.2d 101
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss4/5
COMMENTS
producer who sells habitually is liable for negligence only if he
has actual knowledge that the chattel is dangerous, 10 consciously
misrepresents the source of the chattel,"" or makes reckless
misrepresentations as to the chattel's safety.12 The mere failure
to inspect by such a seller is not negligence.' 3 It should be noted
that all these classes of sellers are habitual sellers. There has
been little litigation concerning the liability to remote users of
casual sellers.1
(1946); Woodside Manor, Inc. v. Rose Brothers Co., 83 A.2d 325 (D.C.
Mun. App. 1951). Cf. Mann v. Leake and Nelson Co., 132 Conn. 251, 43
A.2d 461 (1945).
10. Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 306, 310 (1941).
11. Id. at 313.
12. Id. at 315.
13. Id. at 322. Professor Eldredge relies principally on various secondary
authorities and on the absence of contra cases to support this statement. He
does cite Peaslee-Gaulbert Company v. McMath's Admr., 148 Ky. 265, 146
S.W. 770 (1912); Belcher v. Goff Brothers, 145 Va. 448, 134 S.E. 588(1926); Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co., 108 Cal. App. 22, 290 Pac. 919 (1930);
Noble v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 12 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Wash. 1935); Isbell
v. Biederman Furniture Co., 115 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. App. 1938); and Boyd v.J. C. Penney Co., 195 So. 87 (La. App. 1940) as containing statements that
the vendor's duty is limited to revealing known defects. At 319 Professor
Eldredge states that State, to use of Bond v. Consolidated Gas, E. L. & P.Co., 146 Md. 390, 126 Atl. 105 (1924) and Camden Fire Ins. Co. v. Peterman,
278 Mich. 615, 270 N.W. 807 (1937) held that the vendor is under no duty
to inspect if he received the chattel from a reputable manufacturer.
RESTATEMENT, ToRrs § 401 (1934):
A vendor of a chattel made by a third person which is bought as safefor use in reliance upon the vendor's profession of competence and care
is subject to liability for bodily harm caused by the vendor's failure to
exercise reasonable competence and care to supply the chattel in a con-
dition safe for use.
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 402 (1934):
A vendor of a chattel manufactured by a third person is subject toliability . . . if, although he is ignorant of the dangerous character or
condition of the chattel, he could have discovered it by exercising
reasonable care to utilize the peculiar opportunity and competence
which as a dealer in such chattels he has or should have.
Professor Eldredge analyzes these two sections and the comments to them
and concludes at 324-330 that they do not impose a duty of inspection. He
recognizes at 330-333 three cases which do impose a duty of inspection:
Garvey v. Namm, 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N.Y. Supp. 442 (2d Dep't 1901) ;Santise v. Martins, Inc., 258 App. Div. 663, 17 N.Y.S.2d 741 (2d Dep't
1940) ; and Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 126 Pa. Super. 351, 191
Atl. 384 (1937), aff'd, 330 Pa. 257, 198 Atl. 323 (1938).
See PRosssi, ToRTs 681 (1941):
A dealer who sells goods made by another ordinarily is not held to
the same inspection as the manufacturer, but must exercise the care
and competence of a reasonable dealer as to defects which he has an
oportunity to discover.
Perhaps it may be said that all these authorities mean that the vendor
has a general duty to exercise due care. and that that duty may, in some
unusual circumstances, be breached by a failure to inspect.
14. PaossER, ToRTs 682 (1941).
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The remote seller in the principal case, although a casual
seller, has some of the characteristics of these other types of
sellers. A manufacturer may be held liable because he created
the defect. The seller here also created the defect by an overt
act. On this basis he could be liable. An habitual seller has
considerable knowledge concerning the product he sells. The
seller here, who was engaged in the business of renting cars,
probably had the same degree of knowledge as an habitual
seller.15 He did not, however, have the same volume of sales as
the habitual seller. The seller here bears a closer resemblance
to a building contractor in that his sales are less frequent. It
has been suggested that the main reason for holding the manu-
facturer liable is that his volume of sales is great enough to
allow him to distribute the loss to a large segment of the public
by a slight price increase.26 This reason also applies to liability
of habitual sellers. If the significant fact in determining the
liability of a seller is his volume of sales, then the decision of
the court in the principal case is correct in view of the small
number of sales made by this defendant. If, however, the loss
distribution motivation is not controlling, the decision is erron-
eous in light of the extension of the liability of sellers of defec-
tive products to provide increased consumer protection.
TORTS--TRADE SECRETS-NECESSITY OF CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONSHIP
Smith v. Dravo Corporation, 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
Smith designed and manufactured a novel freight container.
After his death, Dravo Corporation became a prospective buyer
of his business and during negotiations received detailed infor-
mation from his executor concerning the construction of the
container. Dravo decided against the purchase, but, shortly there-
after, marketed a freight container which was almost identical
to that which had been designed and produced by Smith. Smith's
executor brought an action to enjoin Dravo Corporation from
15. The UNIFORMi COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-104, 2-314 (1952), provides for
greater liability on implied warranty grounds for those having special
knowledge of the product sold than for those not having such knowledge.
16. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453 461-468, 150 P.2d 436,
440-444 (1944) (concurring opinion). See Gregory, TWespass to Negligence
to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. Rnv. 359, 382-384 (1951).
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